The body of Nothing But Honor: Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Hubbardton follows a narrative style, but the appendices provide a more in-depth analysis of details and historical arguments surrounding the eyewitness accounts. This excerpt is Appendix D, with some additional maps.

~ Appendix D ~

Sucker Brook Hypothesis

The Straggler Camp and the Sucker Brook Fight

Reconstructions of the Battle of Hubbardton from the late twentieth century to the present usually include detailed descriptions of the retreating American army leaving a camp of stragglers near Sucker Brook and of the battle beginning near this camp in a first phase often called the Sucker Brook fight. The hypothesized Sucker Brook fight is not included in this reconstruction because it lacks supporting evidence, and is directly contradicted by much of the historical record. Within the historiography of the battle can be found a clear genesis of the Sucker Brook Hypothesis within the twentieth century as a result of misinterpretation of sources and erroneous inferences that compounded over time. The historical questions the hypothesis was put forward to address are readily answered with available evidence. Comprehensive comparison of the primary accounts of eyewitnesses all but rule out the possibility of either a straggler camp or any major fighting in the Sucker Brook sector as historical realities. The Sucker Brook Hypothesis is deeply entrenched in modern narratives and is commonly understood by students of the campaign. It has been included as fact in historical works, documentaries, battlefield signage, and visitor center displays. For these reasons, the subject bears a thorough exploration.

Key Features of the Sucker Brook Hypothesis

The following basic elements of the Sucker Brook Hypothesis can be identified in modern interpretations of the battle:

• On the afternoon of July 6, some three hundred stragglers of the retreating American army refused to march any farther than Sucker Brook. They remained in the hollow along that waterway in a distinct “straggler camp” separate from the camp of the rest of the Rear Guard along the Castleton Road 0.4 miles southeast (0.7 miles following the road).
• Something like 150-300 men from companies of different regiments were detached from the Rear Guard and placed along Sucker Brook as a forward defensive line to protect the straggler camp and provide early warning to the rest of the Rear Guard of any enemy approach. The addition of this Sucker Brook defensive line to the straggler camp would have brought the total number of men in this sector up to between 450-600.
• The Sucker Brook defensive line centered on the crossing point of the Sargent Hill route of the Mount Independence Road but extended more than 0.25 miles to the west. Private Ebenezer Fletcher’s account is used as a description of fighting in this area, and his company (Captain Carr’s Company of the 2^nd New Hampshire) is identified as one of those comprising the Sucker Brook line, often described as holding the left flank of the line.
• The straggler camp and the Sucker Brook line were placed under the command of Col. Nathan Hale of the 2^nd New Hampshire, leaving Maj. Benjamin Titcomb to command the bulk of the 2^nd New Hampshire on Monument Hill.
• At 5:00 a.m. on the morning of July 7, an American sentry fired at the British column on Sargent Hill, which overlooks Sucker Brook from the north. The British column halted in the hills, and General Fraser hesitated to attack for an hour while his scouts reconnoitered the American positions. It is variously stated that Major Grant persuaded a reluctant Fraser to launch his attack.
• Sometime between 6:00-7:00 a.m., two companies of the 24^th Foot attacked at the crossing of Sucker Brook. The battalion of Light Infantry deployed to their left and right for a total attacking force of some 450 British troops. Major Grant was killed at the very beginning of the Sucker Brook fight, which lasted fifteen to thirty minutes. A figure of twenty-one casualties at Sucker Brook is commonly given for the British side.
• The American line was overwhelmed and their forces retreated to the main body of the Rear Guard. The straggler camp was overrun and captured, and most of the prisoners that fell into British hands were taken here. Colonel Hale led a group of stragglers some distance through the woods until they surrendered. 
• The fighting in the Sucker Brook sector ended between 6:30-7:15, and the British proceeded on the Mount Independence Road until they became visible to the main body of the Rear Guard, which was just marching or preparing to march. The battle in the Castleton Road/Monument Hill sector then began as a separate engagement.

Historiography Overview

A review of thirty-six histories of the Battle of Hubbardton written between 1779 and 2021 reveals an identifiable progression in the development of the Sucker Brook Hypothesis. A historiography review contains a clear process of formulation and evolution of the Sucker Brook Hypothesis, with attributable moments in the genesis of its key features within the twentieth century.

• Early histories of the battle contained no separate straggler camp or Sucker Brook fight. The battle was described as one singular action. Benson Lossing’s 1852 Field Guide to the Revolution was explicit that the battle commenced in front of the Selleck Cabin and that the heaviest fighting occurred in that sector.[i] A shared feature of early histories was a description of a poor performance by Hale and the 2^nd New Hampshire. Ethan Allen’s 1779 retelling was particularly scathing. Allen described the 2^nd New Hampshire running away almost without firing a shot, leaving Warner and Francis to fight the battle alone.[ii] This became a common theme throughout the 1800s. None of the early histories described the 2^nd New Hampshire camped anywhere but with the rest of the Rear Guard, and several explicitly described Hale, Warner, and Francis together atop a ridge, with Hale’s command running away from the ridge position.
• In 1842, historian Zadock Thompson introduced a softer approach to Hale, noting that assertions of a poor performance might have been the result of the personal jealousy of others.[iii]
• In 1877, G.W. Nesmith sought to rehabilitate Hale. Without referencing any source, Nesmith claimed that Hale was given special charge of the sick and invalids. Nesmith made no mention of a separate camp for these invalids, and nobody else had done so up to that time, so presumably this special assignment over invalids occurred at the main camp along the Castleton Road. Nesmith’s recounting of the battle included several omissions and odd features and vaguely asserted that Hale was first surprised by the British attack and that this justified surrendering or retreating with little resistance.[iv] Following this work, the idea of Hale being in command of the stragglers disappeared for more than a century.
• Also in 1877, Abby Hemenway attempted to reconcile some British sources, noting the battle began at 5:00 a.m., and some American sources that it was 7:00 a.m. with a hypothesized British halt of two hours between the firing of the sentries and Fraser’s attack.[v] The idea did not catch on at the time, and in 1921 Walter Crockett relied largely on the account of Fraser in his deconstruction of the halt hypothesis.[vi]
• The Gerlach Map, drawn just after the battle and later engraved and published in London in 1780, increasingly made an impact on reconstructions presented in American histories of the battle.
• In the early twentieth century, Hoffman Nickerson put forward several theories of the battle that were quickly accepted but have been discredited since. Chief among these was that the Grenadiers had hiked over the top of Mt. Zion on a wide flanking march. In 1928, Nickerson sought to align the Gerlach Map with accounts of Hale running away at the beginning of the fight. He hypothesized that the 2^nd New Hampshire had encamped alone at Sucker Brook and was overrun at the very beginning of the battle. He cited Ebenezer Fletcher’s account as a description of a Sucker Brook fight.[vii] No mention was made of any stragglers, or straggler camp, or refusal to march any farther than the brook. Nickerson’s idea of a Sucker Brook fight caught on, and it was repeated with additional details by Frederic Van de Water in 1941, and by most historians thereafter.[viii]
• In 1960, Ernest Dupuy made a new effort to reconcile the British accounts of a 5:00 a.m. beginning of the battle and American accounts of a 7:00 a.m. beginning by re-inserting a halt hypothesis, though now it was somewhat shorter: only an hour or so. New details were added that Fraser hesitated during the halt, that the natives and loyalists scouted the American positions, and Grant convinced Fraser to attack.[ix] Dupuy’s halt hypothesis caught on and became a common theme in histories thereafter.
• The fullness of the Sucker Brook Hypothesis first appeared in 1988 with John Williams’s work, The Battle of Hubbardton: The American Rebels Stem the Tide. He portrayed the battle as a well-fought textbook rear-guard action by Colonal Seth Warner, utilizing defense in depth.[x] Williams combined elements of several secondary versions of the battle’s opening sequence into the full expression of the theory that has predominated since.
• In 2002, Carmine Pacca cited both Ebenezer Fletcher and Joseph Bird as participants in the Sucker Brook fight and quoted their accounts as descriptions of the action there.[xi] Bruce Venter followed suit in 2015.[xii]

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Sucker Brook Hypothesis had taken full shape, complete with purported eyewitness accounts to support it.

Eyewitness Accounts: No Straggler Camp

Many of the details of the Sucker Brook Hypothesis are not grounded in historical evidence, and some are directly contradicted by available primary sources. The existence of a straggler camp is not supported by the available first-hand accounts. The following briefly summarizes the best primary evidence regarding the condition of the American Rear Guard at Hubbardton on the afternoon of July 6 and night of July 6-7, 1777.

Major Isaac Dunn stated that most of the stragglers and the Rear Guard arrived at Hubbardton before the main army continued to Castleton., saying, “Most of the stragglers and rear guard having joined us, the army was again put in motion. The rear guard here was given to Colonel Warner.”[xiii] He did not mention any of the stragglers stopping before their arrival at the Castleton Road intersection, or of the Rear Guard being in two separate locations. He did not mention any men being detached to guard the stragglers in another location.

Corporal Samuel Field of the Massachusetts Militia wrote, “We marched to Hubbardton, where I saw that some regiments were preparing to halt. Three regiments halted, vis. the regiments of Col. Warner of Vermont, Col. Hale of N.H. & Col. Francis of the Provence of Maine.”[xiv] He described seeing three regiments stopped at Hubbardton, and made no mention of them not camping together, or of any group of stragglers camping in another location.

Sergeant Major Edward Finel of the New York Militia wrote, “We marched through the woods as far as Hubbardtown and making a long tarry for the invalid till almost night and when they came up, the General, with all the army except about 600 or 700 of the invalid, marched on as far as Castletown and the aforesaid number encamped till morning.”[xv] By his account the main army waiting at the Castleton Road remained until the stragglers caught up. He says that they did catch up, and made no mention of any portion of them stopping 0.7 miles short or not camping together in one location.[xvi] 

Private Ebenezer Fletcher of the 2^nd New Hampshire wrote that he was recovering from the measles and fell in the rear of the march. Historians have labelled him a straggler and placed him at Sucker Brook, but he never mentioned being in a straggler camp or camped separate from the rest of the Rear Guard. His battle narrative gives clear indications that he was with his company.[xvii] Historians have placed his company among those guarding the stragglers at Sucker Brook, but Fletcher makes no mention of that either.

Captain Moses Greenleaf of the 11^th Massachusetts noted being at the rear of the march during the retreat and would have been among or behind the bulk of the stragglers when they arrived at Hubbardton.[xviii] He made no mention of a separate straggler camp.

Major Henry Livingston noted the number of stragglers and invalids with the Rear Guard but mentioned no separate camp for them.[xix]

Lieutenant Henry Sewall of the 12^th Massachusetts described encamping at Hubbardton and did not mention a separate straggler camp.[xx]

Captain Enos Stone of the 11^th Massachusetts described camping at Hubbardton, though his journal entries were typically so brief that it is unlikely he would have mentioned a separate straggler camp had one existed.[xxi]

Captain Benjamin Wallcutt of the 10^th Massachusetts described the Rear Guard arriving in Hubbardton at three or four in the afternoon on July 6. He described seeing Warner, Francis, and Hale in the Selleck Cabin together and hearing them say they would not march farther that night.[xxii] He made no mention of a straggler camp.

The existence of a large American camp at Sucker Brook, or a straggler camp in any location separate from the Rear Guard in the Castleton Road/Monument Hill sector, is entirely absent from all eyewitness accounts of the condition of the encampment and disposition of the invalids. No primary source indicates that Colonel Hale was given responsibility for the stragglers, and no mention of such an assignment was made until a century after the battle, and then without citing any source. The existence of a straggler camp at Sucker Brook lacks supporting evidence and may be considered an artifact of erroneous inferences made in the twentieth century.

Eyewitness Accounts: No Sucker Brook Fight

Comprehensive examination of the primary source accounts of the initial contact and development of the Battle of Hubbardton reveal consistent themes that are incompatible with the opening phase of the fighting described in the Sucker Brook Hypothesis. Taken together, they provide a remarkably unified and consistent narrative that is irreconcilable with any major action in the Sucker Brook sector. Each American and British account of the beginning of the battle is presented alongside a brief explanation of key factors.

American Accounts of the Opening Phase of the Battle of Hubbardton

Private Joseph Bird, 12^th Massachusetts, has been used as a primary source for a Sucker Brook fight by dividing his account in two and assigning the portion recounting his surprise at the British approach to the Sucker Brook sector and the portion recounting forming behind the log fence to the Castleton Road sector.[xxiii] A full read of his account gives no indication of any such change in time or location. Bird presents a narrative of one engagement beginning with an unexpected British appearance over a rise just west of his camp near the Selleck Cabin, and of the Americans immediately forming behind the nearby log fence along the Castleton Road.

I was boiling chocolate, and carried it down to the road, coming in from Mount Independence; when one of our men jumped up, and cocked his gun to fire, they didn‘t let him fire. Then, I turned and looked, to see what he was going to shoot at and I saw the enemy, aforming about 15 rods from us. ―we were ordered to form, on the East side of the log fence… when we had got over the fence, the rise of land shut out the British from our [sight]. We saw them attack our right. we didn‘t fire much, till the enemy formed on the clearing. While the enemy were forming Capt. [Enos] Stone, went forward, and from the rail fence, East of the garden, next to the Selleck house, on the west side of the… road, removed the three top rails, for seven or eight lengths, so that we could have a better chance at them. We drove them back twice, by cutting them down so fast. We didn‘t leave [the] log fence or charge them. The action began on our right, which soon gave way. They couldn‘t drive us from the fence, until they charged us. I was near the center, opposite the west road, under Col. Francis. Hale commanded our right.[xxiv]

Captain Enos Stone, 12^th Massachusetts, described one singular engagement beginning with a sudden British approach. Stone was mentioned by name in Joseph Bird’s account, enabling cross-referencing of details and positive location at the Castleton Road.

7 in m: the Inemy came upon us without warning. We gave them Battel. the ingagement held one hour 10 minutes[xxv]

Captain Moses Greenleaf, 11^th Massachusetts, described one engagement beginning with a sudden British appearance within two hundred yards of the Castleton Road.

March‘d apart of the Regt at 20 Minutes past 7 the Enemy appear‘d within Gun shot of us we fac‘d to the right then the firing began, which Lasted till ¾ past Eight A.M. without Cessation[xxvi]

Corporal Samuel Giles, 11^th Massachusetts, described one engagement that began with a British attack on a camp geographically referenced to the same swale in front of the Selleck house described by Joseph Bird, where the British approached over a rise of ground to the west. In the Sucker Brook sector, following the road course accepted in the Sucker Brook Hypothesis, the British approach would have come from heights to the north.

―…..his mess were just making their breakfast, when they were saluted by a volley of Musketry. That the enemy came up over a rise of ground on the west, and rushed down upon their encampment. The Americans were soon formed, and the battle raged fiercely.[xxvii]

Sergeant Major Edward Finel, New York Militia, recounted that a small scout was sent out from the Castleton Road sector as part of the Rear Guard was preparing to march. He described one engagement beginning at the Castleton Road with a brief period of alarm provided by this scouting party just prior to the British appearance at a distance of just over a hundred yards.

while we were preparing to move forward, sending out a small scout which soon returned and informed us that the enemy were close by which put us something to a confusion. While we were pausing what to do, we espied in the woods about twenty rood off a number of Regulars advancing toward us, which, when they saw them, Colonel Warner ordered the men to draw themselves in line of battle, which they soon did behind a log fence. The enemy soon advanced and began a very smart firing on both sides.[xxviii]

Lieutenant Colonel George Reid, 1^st New Hampshire, also noted a brief period of alarm, probably from the same scout mentioned by Edward Finel. Reid described events at the southern end of the American line as one engagement that began with a British attack at the Castleton Road.

in the Morning when our troops were about to Muster in order to march, an alarm came in that a large body of the enemy were close upon us, what part of our Regiment were with me happened to be just drawn up and marching towards the left which was our way to proceed, as soon as the alarm came I formed our Regt on the left, but the whole having but little time was in Considerable Confusion, it was not over ten minutes from the time we had the first notice untill we received a verry heavy fire from the enemy.[xxix]

Private Ebenezer Fletcher, 2^nd New Hampshire, described one engagement. He was vague as to location and geography, only mentioning that there were girdled trees where he fought. Bird placed Hale and the 2^nd New Hampshire to his north, and Fletcher’s account echoes the general surprise at the British approach noted by others in the central and northern American positions along the Castleton Road.

The morning after our retreat, orders came very early for the troops to refresh and be ready for marching. Some were eating, some were cooking, and all in a very unfit posture for battle. Just as the sun rose, there was a cry, “the enemy are upon us.” Looking round I saw the enemy in line of battle. Orders came to lay down our packs and be ready for action. The fire instantly began. We were but few in number compared to the enemy. At the commencement of the battle, many of our party retreated back into the woods. Capt. Carr came up and says, “My lads advance, we shall beat them yet.” A few of us followed him in view of the enemy. Every man was trying to secure himself behind girdled trees, which were standing on the place of action.[xxx]

Ensign Thomas Blake, 1^st New Hampshire, concisely described one engagement.

Early in the morning our rear guard was attacked by about 600 of the enemy; the engagement held some time with considerable loss on both sides.[xxxi]

Lieutenant Henry Sewall, 12^th Massachusetts, concisely described one engagement.

The regulars, Hessians & Indians attack‘d us a little after sunrise & after a heavy fire oblige‘d us to retreat.[xxxii]

Samuel Patch, 12^th Massachusetts, concisely described one engagement.

a part of the British force attacked the rear Division for our force in which was our company, and our force was defeated and Col. Francis was killed in battle, and our forces was dispersed and very much scattered.[xxxiii]

British Accounts of the Opening Phase of the Battle of Hubbardton

Brigadier General Simon Fraser wrote of one engagement beginning in front of the Castleton Road near the southern base of Monument Hill. Fraser’s account has been used to describe a Sucker Brook fight by removing “my advanced Scouts descried the Enemy’s Centry’s who fired and joined the main body” from its context within the overall narrative, and misinterpreting the meaning of the phrases used. The term “sentries” typically referred to a company-sized element or smaller that was detailed to guard or watch a specific location or portion of a perimeter. A Sucker Brook interpretation would have Fraser using “Centries” to describe an American force of 450-600 men. It would also have him describing a sustained battle of fifteen to thirty minutes and resulting in twenty-one British casualties with the words “fired and joined the main body.” Worth noting is that many interpretations give that passage double-duty, drawing from it an encounter with a sentry on Sargent Hill in the approach march to Sucker Brook, as well as the action at Sucker Brook itself.

A more reasonable interpretation of Fraser’s account is that a section or platoon-sized element, possibly the “small scout” mentioned by Edward Finel, met the approaching British. They fired once and then quickly retreated southeast toward the southern portion of their main body, providing a few minutes warning in only the southern part of the American camp. Fraser explained that after the fire of the American sentries, his men were still in column of march when they unexpectedly encountered the whole American force. His account is geographically located to the southern edge of Monument Hill, where Major Grant’s two companies would reach the rise along the Mount Independence Road in front of the American positions, and the Light Infantry on the road would have Monument Hill in view to their left. The Light Infantry’s axis of advance up Monument Hill from the south against the 2^nd New Hampshire was noted by Joseph Bird at the Castleton Road when he wrote, “We saw them attack our right…Hale commanded our right.” Fraser gave this account;

my advanced Scouts descried the Enemy’s Centry’s who fired and joined the main body. Major Grant who commanded the advanced Guard, had orders to take post, I intended to form the Light Infantry Battalion to his left, and keep my Granadiers as a Reserve, but circumstances obliged me to alter this disposition. The whole were in order of march, when we found ourselves so near the Rebels. I was at the head of the Light Infantry Battalion, it had then a pretty steep hill on the left flank, I halted the Light Infantry, faced them to the left and with the whole in front I ran up the hill with them, and we met the Rebels endeavoring to get possession of it;[xxxiv]

Lieutenant William Digby, Grenadiers, wrote of one engagement that began with an encounter with the full American force posted on heights behind breastworks, consistent with positions in the Monument Hill/Castleton Road Sector. Digby described Grant being killed there, in a location entirely inconsistent with the Sucker Brook sector. 

After marching 4 or 5 miles we came up with above 2000 of the enemy strongly posted on the top of a high hill, with breastworks before them, and great trees cut across to prevent our approach ; but notwithstanding all these difficulties, they had no effect on the ardor always shewn by British Troops, who with the greatest steadiness and resolution, mounted the hill amidst showers of balls mixed with buck shot, which they plentifully bestowed amongst us. We had near two hundred killed and wounded. Major Grant, 24th Regiment who had the advanced guard was the first who fell.[xxxv]

Lieutenant Francis Lord Napier, Light Infantry, wrote of one engagement that began with an encounter with the full American force in a location where the Light Infantry had a hill to their left, which they attacked. He also described Grant being alive and in command at the beginning of the attack in the Monument Hill/Castleton Road sector.

About five O’Clock in the morning came up with a body of about 2000 Rebels at a place called Hubbertown. The Brigadier observing a commanding ground upon the left of his Light Infantry ordered it to be possessed by that Corps, and a considerable body of the Enemy attempting the same, they met. The Enemy were driven back to their original post. The advanced guard under Major Grant were by this time engaged, & the Grenadiers were advanced to sustain them & to prevent the Right flank being turned.[xxxvi]

John Macnamara Hayes, Surgeon, arrived the following day but wrote of one engagement that began as an encounter with the full American force is it was preparing to march. He notes that as soon as two companies of British appeared, they took to breastworks. This is consistent with descriptions of the encounter at the Castleton Road.

the 7th in the Morn[in]g, came up with a Body of them ab[ou]t 2,000 who were in Ambush, or as I suppose it, preparing to set off, as they were putting on their Napsacks &c., but upon two Companies shewing themselves, they soon betook themselves to their Breastworks, which is a Mode of the defence they have adopted, and as our people eager to be at them, they immediately fired & every shot took effect; the Remainder of our people pushed, a smart Engagement ensued.[xxxvii]

Lieutenant Joshua Pell was not present but heard from others and wrote of one engagement beginning with an encounter with the full American force, which was formed behind a log fence, consistent with accounts of the Castleton Road sector.

Part of the Advance Corps came up with the Rebels at Hubberton, about six in the morning, very strongly posted ; the Rebels consisted of near two thousand, and form’d behind the inclosures, which in this Country are compos’d of large Trees, laid one upon the other and makes a strong breastwork : The advance Corps consisted of ten Company’s of British Light Infantry, ten Comp’ys of the 24th Regiment, the whole amounted to no more than eight hundred men ; our Men form’d briskly, ascended the Hill within thirty yards of the Rebels and immediately began a brisk fire, which lasted one hour and half.[xxxviii]

Captain Charles Stanhope, Grenadiers, provided a brief description of one engagement. 

They behaved in the beginning of the action, with a great deal of spirit; but on the British troops rushing on them with their bayonets, they gave way in great confusion.[xxxix]

Lieutenant Richard Pope, Grenadiers, described a meeting with the full American force in strong positions.

came up with near 2000 of the Enemy, strongly posted, attacked and defeated them.[xl]

Major Alexander Lindsay, Light Infantry, left no detailed account, but in his short testimony about the battle did not mention two engagements, or overrunning a straggler camp and taking over a hundred prisoners, which is especially notable because it is his men who would have done this in the Sucker Brook Hypothesis.[xli]

The Anburey Account has been noted as a potential collected composite of secondary accounts assembled as a literary device to retell the history of the campaign (see Appendix F). Regardless, there are no details within the Anburey account that counter the details provided by confirmed primary sources.

Problems with the Sucker Brook Hypothesis

Analysis of the primary source descriptions of the situation of the American camp and of the beginning of the Battle of Hubbardton form a remarkably consistent and coherent description of a clear course of events. The unified narrative they provide is irreconcilable with many details found in the Sucker Brook Hypothesis. The evidence provided by the primary accounts present a set of major problems in the Sucker Brook Hypothesis. In combination, they all but rule out the Sucker Brook Hypothesis as an historical possibility.

No American sources described a separate straggler camp, a Sucker Brook defensive line, or a Sucker Brook fight.

No American primary sources described any refusal among stragglers to march farther than Sucker Brook, or any separate camp for stragglers. None mentioned any troops sent to protect a separate encampment. No American sources described being anywhere other than along the Castleton Road, and none mentioned any knowledge of two separate engagements on the morning of July 7.

No American sources described Colonel Hale in command at Sucker Brook, and some indicated his presence on Monument Hill.

None of the American sources described Hale in charge of stragglers or in command of a separate camp or defensive line at Sucker Brook. Joseph Bird of the 12th Massachusetts placed Hale in command of the 2nd New Hampshire on Monument Hill. Silas Pratt of Warner’s Regiment noted a colonel leaving the southern flank in the lurch at a critical moment, and vitriol against Hale was seemingly strongest in Vermont.

No American sources mentioned an exposed camp being overrun and captured either in the condemnations of Hale’s conduct or in the courts of inquiry that followed.

That a camp in a location as exposed as the Sucker Brook sector should have been allowed to exist with the Rear Guard camped less than a mile away would require some explanation in the aftermath of the battle. In the hunt for scapegoats that followed, minute details became in-depth lines of questioning. Attempts to assign blame for such an exposed camp falling into enemy hands would have been recorded in multiple letters and official proceedings. It would almost certainly have resulted in significant scrutiny in the courts of inquiry that were held. No such scrutiny exists in the historical record.

American sources consistently reported surprise at the appearance of British forces in the Castleton Road sector.

The accounts of Enos Stone, Joseph Bird, Moses Greenleaf, and Samuel Giles describe being attacked without warning at the Castleton Road. Edward Finel and George Reid described an attack on the southern end of the line with only a brief warning from a scout that was sent out from the Castleton Road sector. Ebenezer Fletcher and others either note surprise but are vague as to location, or note the Castleton Road as the location but are vague as to surprise.

No American sources at the Castleton Road recorded hearing a Sucker Brook fight.

None of the American sources camped in the Monument Hill/Castleton Road sector 0.4 miles away from Sucker Brook recorded hearing a sustained battle lasting fifteen to thirty minutes with six or seven hundred muskets firing, though the battle around Monument Hill was clearly heard by Riedesel several miles to the northwest, as well as by the main American army at Castleton six miles to the south.

No American sources at the Castleton Road recorded hundreds of refugees from a Sucker Brook fight entering their camp and raising an alarm.

Depending on the number of prisoners that would have been taken at Sucker Brook, and how many refugees from that sector would have fled into the woods away from the Rear Guard, somewhere between 150-500 defeated Americans should have retreated into the American camp at the Castleton Road. This could not have gone unnoticed and almost certainly would have been recorded by witnesses. It would have been all but impossible for any American at the Castleton Road to have been surprised by the appearance of the British. None of the American sources described any general alarm apart from that in the south from a “small scout” just prior to the engagement in that sector.

No artifacts were found indicating any camp or battle in the identified Sucker Brook sector.

A 2001 archaeological survey with metal detectors and shovel tests searched an area near Sucker Brook that was identified in the Sucker Brook Hypothesis as likely to yield militarily sensitive material from a camp and engagement. No eighteenth century artifacts were found.[xlii] There does exist a possibility that the Mount Independence Road did not cross Sucker Brook in that area (See Appendix E).

No British sources mentioned any halt or reconnoitering to account for the noted time differential.

No British primary sources described an extended halt preparatory to an attack beginning the battle, or any information consistent with prior knowledge of American dispositions. None noted a tactical situation or orders consistent with a planned or premeditated attack. British sources uniformly described events consistent with a march directly to contact with the main American force, and a battle beginning immediately on contact. The time differential is readily explainable through alternate methods (See Appendix G).

No British sources described a straggler camp or Sucker Brook fight, or any action prior to the main action at Monument Hill and the Castleton Road.

None of the British sources described participation in or knowledge of a Sucker Brook fight, or any major action prior to coming upon the full American Rear Guard at the Castleton Road and on Monument Hill. Fraser, Digby, and Napier all describe Grant alive and in command at the beginning of the attack in the Castleton Road/Monument Hill sector, when according to the Sucker Brook Hypothesis he should have been killed at Sucker Brook at least thirty minutes before.

No British sources recorded overrunning an advanced camp, capturing large numbers of prisoners at the beginning of the battle, or detaching men to guard these prisoners.

None of the British accounts are consistent with defeating an advanced American line or overrunning a large encampment at the outset of the battle. No British sources recounted the capture of hundreds of stragglers at the beginning of the action. None mentioned detaching any men to guard these prisoners. Certainly, Fraser and likely others would have written of taking that many prisoners at the beginning of the fight. It would have been a key achievement of the morning.

British sources described an unanticipated encounter with the full American force near Monument Hill.

Fraser reported being as surprised as the Americans to encounter enemy forces in the Monument Hill/Castleton Road sector. Other British sources repeatedly noted an encounter with the full American force near the Castleton Road and Monument Hill in language consistent with the opening of an unexpected meeting engagement.

The Sucker Brook Hypothesis requires that Fraser aggressively pursued the Americans, then found an exposed invalid camp and hesitated to attack it for an hour or more.

From the British perspective, the American retreat from Ticonderoga had flushed the prey from its stronghold, and now the American army could be caught and destroyed. Several sources noted a clear intent to chase down and attack the retreating Americans. Fraser’s pursuit was rapid and aggressive. Of the rebel Rear Guard, Fraser recorded, “I meant to attack it.” He recalled telling Riedesel on the afternoon of July 6, “I had discretionary powers to attack the Enemy where-ever I could come up with them, & that I determined to do it.” The Sucker Brook Hypothesis requires that Fraser, with 850 of the cream of the British army, looked down from high ground on an exposed and disorganized camp of three hundred sick and invalids with a thin line of 150-300 men guarding it and suddenly became hesitant to bring on an engagement with such a force; that he halted for an hour to reconnoiter, and then reluctantly attacked only at the urging of Grant.  

The Sucker Brook Hypothesis requires that Fraser reconnoitered the American positions for an hour yet was surprised to find them where they were.

Fraser clearly described being unprepared to encounter the American force while his men were in column of march on the road near Monument Hill.[xliii] This is not consistent with the reconnaissance claimed in the Sucker Brook Hypothesis.

The Sucker Brook hypothesis requires that at the conclusion of the Sucker Brook fight, the British reformed into march column on the Mount Independence Road and then advanced to the base of Monument Hill.

Following a Sucker Brook fight, in order to be where they would need to be for the next phase of the action as described by Fraser, on a road in order of march in a location from which the Light Infantry could face left to go up Monument Hill, the British would have had to reform on the Mount Independence Road in column of march and proceed as though the Sucker Brook fight had never happened.

Conclusion

The Sucker Brook Hypothesis, which reconstructs the Battle of Hubbardton as beginning around a straggler camp at Sucker Brook, is not supported by the available historical evidence. Descriptions of a straggler camp or fighting at Sucker Brook are notably absent from primary accounts. Eyewitnesses from both sides provide a consistent and unified narrative of the battle beginning in the Monument Hill/Castleton Road sector in a manner incompatible with the Sucker Brook Hypothesis. A thorough review of the historiography of the battle reveals an identifiable genesis and development of the details of the Sucker Brook Hypothesis within the twentieth century as a result of misinterpretation of primary sources and erroneous inferences compounded over time. The key elements of the Sucker Brook Hypothesis are not found in documentary evidence contemporary to the events. The problems the hypothesis was adapted to address are answered with existing primary evidence. The Sucker Brook reconstruction found in many modern histories of the Battle of Hubbardton is without historical basis.        

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[i] Benson J. Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution in Two Volumes, Volume I, (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1852).

[ii] Ethan Allen, A Narrative of Col. Ethan Allen’s Captivity (Philadelphia, PA: Robert Bell, 1779).

[iii] Zadock Thompson, History of Vermont; Natural, Civil and Statistical, (Burlington, VT: Chauncey Goodrich, 1842).

[iv] G.W. Nesmith, “New Hampshire at Saratoga,” The Granite Monthly, vol. 1, (1877), accessed online September 3, 2025 https://scholars.unh.edu/granite_monthly/1

[v] Abby Maria Hemenway, The Vermont Historical Gazetteer: A history of Each Town, Civil, Ecclesiastical, Biographical and Military, Volume III, Orleans and Rutland Counties, (Claremont, NH: The Clarement Manufacturing Company, 1877).

[vi] Walter Hill Crockett, Vermont: The Green Mountain State, Volume Two, (New York, NY: The Century History Company, Inc, 1921).

[vii] Hoffman Nickerson, The Turning Point of the Revolution, or Burgoyne in America, (Boston, MA and New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928).

[viii] Frederic F. Van de Water, The Reluctant Republic: Vermont 1724-1791, (New York, NY: The John Day Company, 1941).

[ix] Col. R. Ernest Dupuy, The Battle of Hubbardton: A Critical Analysis, (Prepared for the State of Vermont Historic Sites Commission, 1960).

[x] John Williams, The Battle of Hubbardton: The American Rebels Stem the Tide, Vermont Division of Historic Preservation, 1988.

[xi] Carmine A. Pacca, “July Guns of Colonial Patriots: The Battle of Hubbardton,” Rutland Historical Society Quarterly, 32(2):2-16, 2002.

[xii] Bruce M. Venter, The Battle of Hubbardton: The Rear Guard Action that Saved America, (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2015).

[xiii] “Proceedings of a general court martial, held at White Plains, in the state of New-York, by order of His Excellency General Washington, commander in chief of the army of the United States of America, for the trial of Major General St. Clair, August 25, 1778, Major General Lincoln, president,” In the digital collection Evans Early American Imprint Collection, University of Michigan Library Digital Collections, accessed September 5, 2025. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/N12772.0001.001.

[xiv] Samuel Field, Pension record quoted in ’Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site (VT-RU-40), Historical Survey, Property Survey, and ABPP Documentation Project (GA-2255-08-028), Submitted by Kathleen M. Kenney and John G. Crock, Ph.D, June 30, 2010.

[xv] Edward A. Finel, A Journal of the Retreat from Ticonderoga July 6, 1777, P. Johnson Papers copied to https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/Finel-2, accessed August 28, 2025.

[xvi] Edward A. Finel, A Journal of the Retreat from Ticonderoga July 6, 1777, P. Johnson Papers copied to https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/Finel-2, accessed August 28, 2025.

[xvii] Ebenezer Fletcher, Narrative of the Captivity & Sufferings of Ebenezer Fletcher, of New Ipswich, Fourth Edition, (Printed by S. Wilder, New Ipswich, NH, 1827).

[xviii] Moses Greenleaf, Diary of, quoted in ’Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site (VT-RU-40), Historical Survey, Property Survey, and ABPP Documentation Project (GA-2255-08-028), Submitted by Kathleen M. Kenney and John G. Crock, Ph.D, June 30, 2010.

[xix] Henry Livingston, Account given to Henry Hall quoted in ’Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site (VT-RU-40), Historical Survey, Property Survey, and ABPP Documentation Project (GA-2255-08-028), Submitted by Kathleen M. Kenney and John G. Crock, Ph.D, June 30, 2010.

[xx] Henry Sewall, Diary of Henry Sewell, 1776-1783, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 11(2):75-92, 1963.

[xxi] Capt. Enos Stone, “Capt. Enos Stone‘s Journal,” New England Historical and Genealogical Register, Communicated by Jaruis M. Hatch, Volume XV, (Rochester, New York, 1861), pp 299-304.

[xxii] Benjamin Wallcutt, Account given to Henry Hall quoted in ’Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site (VT-RU-40), Historical Survey, Property Survey, and ABPP Documentation Project (GA-2255-08-028), Submitted by Kathleen M. Kenney and John G. Crock, Ph.D, June 30, 2010.

[xxiii] Bruce M. Venter, The Battle of Hubbardton: The Rear Guard Action that Saved America, (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2015).

[xxiv] Joseph Bird, Account given to Henry Hall quoted in ’Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site (VT-RU-40), Historical Survey, Property Survey, and ABPP Documentation Project (GA-2255-08-028). (Submitted by Kathleen M. Kenney and John G. Crock, Ph.D, June 30, 2010).

[xxv] Capt. Enos Stone, “Capt. Enos Stone‘s Journal,” New England Historical and Genealogical Register, Communicated by Jaruis M. Hatch, Volume XV, (Rochester, New York, 1861), pp 299-304.

[xxvi] Moses Greenleaf, Diary of, quoted in ’Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site (VT-RU-40), Historical Survey, Property Survey, and ABPP Documentation Project (GA-2255-08-028), Submitted by Kathleen M. Kenney and John G. Crock, Ph.D, June 30, 2010.

[xxvii] Samuel Giles, Account quoted in ’Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site (VT-RU-40), Historical Survey, Property Survey, and ABPP Documentation Project (GA-2255-08-028), Submitted by Kathleen M. Kenney and John G. Crock, Ph.D, June 30, 2010.

[xxviii] Edward A. Finel, A Journal of the Retreat from Ticonderoga July 6, 1777, P. Johnson Papers copied to https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/Finel-2, accessed August 28, 2025.

[xxix] Lt. Col. George Reid, George Reid to Jn. Neysmith, Moses Creek, NY, 22 July 1777, Quoted in Ti’s Evacuation and the Battle of Hubbardton, By Michael Barbieri, Journal of the American Revolution, July 24, 2024. https://allthingsliberty.com/2014/07/tis-evacuation-and-the-battle-of-hubbardton/

[xxx] Ebenezer Fletcher, Narrative of the Captivity & Sufferings of Ebenezer Fletcher, of New Ipswich, Fourth Edition, (Printed by S. Wilder, New Ipswich, NH, 1827).

[xxxi] Thomas Blake, “Journal of Lieutenant Thomas Blake,”Vermont Historical Society, John P. Clement Papers, Doc 153.

[xxxii] Henry Sewall, Diary of Henry Sewell, 1776-1783, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 11(2):75-92, 1963.

[xxxiii] Samuel Patch, Account given in Pension R 7,991 quoted in ’Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site (VT-RU-40), Historical Survey, Property Survey, and ABPP Documentation Project (GA-2255-08-028), Submitted by Kathleen M. Kenney and John G. Crock, Ph.D, June 30, 2010.

[xxxiv] Brig. Gen. Simon Fraser, Letter to John Robinson 13 July, 1777, in Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society, October 18 and November 2, 1898, Appendix D, (Free Press Association Printers, Burlington, VT, 1899).

[xxxv] Lt. William Digby, The British invasion from the north. The campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne, from Canada, 1776-1777, with the journal of Lieut. William Digby, of the 53d, or Shropshire regiment of foot, (J. Munsell’s Sons, Albany, NY, 1887).

[xxxvi] Francis Napier, “Lord Francis Napier‘s Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign,” Edited by S. Sydney Bradford, Maryland Historical Society, 57(4):285-333, 1962.

[xxxvii] John MacNamara Hayes, “Letter from Dr. John Macnamara Hayes, Hubbarton; to Charles Mellish, 13 Jul. 1777,” University of Nottingham, Manuscripts and Special Collections, Me C 29/17, accessed August 28, 2025. http://mssweb.nottingham.ac.uk/elearning/view-vframes.asp?resource=Conflict&ref=mec29-17&theme=3&view=vframes&page=2

[xxxviii] Joshua Pell Jr, Diary of Joshua Pell, Junior: An Officer of the British Army in America 1776 – 1777, The Magazine of American History with Notes and Queries Edited by John Austin Stevens, pp. 107-12, (NY & Chicago: Feb. 1878).

[xxxix] Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, Lieut. A State of the Expedition from Canada as Laid Before the House of Commons by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, and Verified by Evidence, (London, England: J. Almon, 1780).

[xl] Richard Pope, Military Journal and Commonplace Book of Richard Pope 47th Regiment, Ms, Huntington Library and Art Gallery, San Marino, California.

[xli] Alexander Lindsay, Earl of Balcarres, Testimony of Earl of Balcarres from Burgoyne, State of the Expedition from Canada, London, 1780, Vermont Historical Society, John P. Clement Papers, Doc 153.

[xlii] Hartgen Archeological Associates, Inc, Phase IB Archeological Survey Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site Town of Hubbardton Rutland County, Vermont, Prepared for the Vermont Division for Historic Preservation, Montpelier, Vermont, by Hartgen Archeological Associates, Inc. Putney, Vermont. (HAA#V114), 2002.

[xliii] Brig. Gen. Simon Fraser, Letter to John Robinson 13 July, 1777, in Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society, October 18 and November 2, 1898, Appendix D, (Free Press Association Printers, Burlington, VT, 1899).